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Two-Stage  Utility Maximization  and
Import Demand  Systems  Revisited:
Limitations and an Alternative
George  C. Davis and Kim L. Jensen
Two-stage utility maximization  theory has been widely used in the literature
to estimate import demand for agricultural commodities that are often inputs.
This article examines the overlooked  conceptual  and empirical limitations  of
applying two-stage  utility maximization  theory to model the demand for im-
ported commodities that are inputs. A discussion is presented about how the
underutilized  theory of two-stage profit maximization  overcomes these limi-
tations.  Also discussed are  the conditions under which errors  resulting from
misapplied  utility theory may not be severe. An empirical illustration of the
two-stage  profit maximization procedure is provided.
Key words:  conditional elasticities, import demand, two-stage maximization,
unconditional elasticities,  weak separability.
Introduction
Estimated  elasticities  of import demand often  have been used to examine policy alter-
natives and to formulate trade policy (Thompson  1988). The effectiveness of using these
estimated  elasticities  in policy  formulation  hinges  on  the  appropriate  conceptual  and
empirical specification of the underlying model. The two-stage utility maximization model
has been widely used in the estimation of agricultural commodity import demand systems
and elasticities (Alston et al.; de Gorter and Meilke; Duffy, Wohlgenant, and Richardson;
Goddard;  Haniotis;  Heien  and  Pick;  Lin  and  Makus;  Sarris).  The  popularity  of this
modeling approach likely can be traced to its empirical advantages:  with limited degrees
of freedom,  estimating  price parameters  across  export  sources  is less  problematic  (de
Janvry and Bieri), and multicollinearity  problems are mitigated (Fuss).
However, many imported agricultural commodities are inputs in a production process.
Use of utility-based demand systems to estimate import demand for these types of com-
modities has important  conceptual and empirical disadvantages that have not been dis-
cussed in the literature. Furthermore,  misuse of the results of these models can produce
misleading policy implications.  The purpose of this article is to point out the disadvantages
of misapplying the two-stage utility maximization approach and to show how an underuti-
lized methodology  overcomes the approach's disadvantages,  but retains its advantages.1
The parameter bias resulting from misapplying utility theory also is discussed, along with
the conditions under which this bias is not severe.
The remainder of the article proceeds  as follows.  In the next section,  we discuss how
the conceptual misspecification of many agricultural imports as final goods leads to three
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empirical problems.  In the third section,  we provide a general presentation of the often
more appropriate  and  underutilized  theory  of two-stage,  multiproduct,  profit maximi-
zation theory which  removes the empirical  limitations  discussed in the second  section,
while maintaining the empirical advantages of the two-stage utility maximization model.
We  discuss  the significant  theoretical  and  empirical  differences  between  the two-stage
utility and two-stage  profit approaches.  Furthermore,  we explicitly show that previously
estimated conditional (second-stage) demand systems derived from consumer theory can
be justified based on producer  theory. The  fourth section consists  of an empirical  illus-
tration designed to demonstrate the econometric issues involved in estimating the model.
We  specifically  concentrate  on  demonstrating  the procedures  for testing  the sufficient
conditions for two-stage maximization which are usually assumed a priori. We also discuss
the difficulties associated with estimating  the model's first stage and therefore estimating
the unconditional  elasticities.  The article ends with a summary and conclusions  section.
Conceptual and Empirical Limitations of Two-Stage  Utility Maximization  Models
The most prevalently discussed theoretical and empirical limitations regarding agricultural
import demand based on two-stage utility maximization have been weak separability and
functional  form  (e.g.,  Alston  et al.).  While  weak  separability  and  functional  form  are
important,  we  wish  to point out four  other  disadvantages  of basing  most  agricultural
import demands on the theory  of two-stage utility maximization.  These additional  dis-
advantages  seem  to have been overlooked.  One is conceptual;  three are  empirical  and
stem from the conceptual problem.
The obvious  conceptual  disadvantage of utility-based  import demand systems is the
overwhelming  observational  evidence that most imported  agricultural commodities  are
inputs, not final goods. This conceptual misspecification leads to three less obvious em-
pirical disadvantages.  First, at the level of aggregation usually considered by agricultural
economists, it is difficult to form a consensus when defining the first-stage utility aggregates.
For example, in utility-based models, the pragmatic approach has been to choose a com-
modity such as soybeans  (e.g., Heien  and Pick; Haniotis),  and assume that it is weakly
separable from all other goods. Even if the specification of soybeans in the utility function
were acceptable, the assumption that soybeans are weakly separable from all other oilseeds
and grains, which for logical consistency also must be included in the utility function, is
disconcerting. It is further disconcerting  that the other commodities also are assumed to
in  fact  help form  a  single  consistent  aggregate  called  "all  other goods."  Such  unique
separability conditions are not intuitive and therefore  cause the choice of first-stage ag-
gregates to be highly  debatable.  In addition to the degrees-of-freedom  problem,  the in-
ability to form  a consensus when  defining the first-stage utility aggregates  may explain
why many  studies have  concentrated  on  conditional demand  systems (i.e.,  the  second
stage). Despite  these conceptual  problems, conditional  demand  systems have been em-
pirically  successful in many applications  (Thompson  1981),  from wheat (e.g.,  Grennes,
Johnson, and  Thursby) to beef (Goddard). This fact raises  a puzzling  question: If con-
ditional import demand systems based on utility theory are conceptually  flawed, why are
they empirically successful? We provide a possible answer to this question in the following
section.
Because the most prevalent systems estimated have been conditional demand systems,
the estimated demand elasticities have been conditional elasticities. This fact leads to the
second problem:  Because conditional elasticities do not encompass all of the price effects
captured by unconditional elasticities, misuse of conditional elasticities can lead to biased
inference  and  erroneous  policy prescriptions.  For example,  Thompson  (1988)  claimed
that import demand elasticities became the single most important policy issue in the 1985
Farm Bill. Yet, almost all of the literature discussed was based on conditional elasticity
estimates and not unconditional  elasticity estimates.
Even  where  the  unconditional  elasticities  have  been estimated  (e.g.,  de  Gorter  and
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Meilke;  Heien and Pick),  a third problem arises: Unconditional  elasticities derived from
misapplied utility theory are not structural parameter (elasticity) estimates, but are instead
reduced-form  estimates and will differ from those derived from producer theory because
the regressors  are incorrect.  Therefore,  many structural  hypotheses of consumer theory
seemingly may be rejected, when in fact the parameters  of interest are not identified and
the underlying hypothesis  test is inappropriate.  More  importantly,  policy prescriptions
again can be erroneous.
An Appealing Alternative
From the above  discussion,  an alternative  conceptual  approach  will  be  appealing if it
satisfies three criteria: (a) it makes estimation of structural (derived demand) parameters
possible;  (b) it  retains  the empirical  advantages  of the two-stage  utility  maximization
procedure; and (c) it makes defining the first-stage aggregates, and therefore the estimation
of unconditional  elasticities, easier. These criteria all can be satisfied by modeling import
demand  in a two-stage,  multiproduct,  profit  maximization  framework.  Specifically,  by
using  producer theory,  the conceptual  problem of treating  inputs  as final goods  is  im-
mediately  overcome  and  so the estimated  parameters  will be  structural.  Also,  because
this is a two-stage  procedure, the empirical advantages  of a two-stage optimization  pro-
cedure  are retained.  Finally,  defining  the first-stage  aggregates  is more intuitive in the
profit maximization  model, and therefore the estimation of the unconditional elasticities
is  less  debatable.  The  presentation  given  here integrates  and  synthesizes  the works  of
several authors. 2
First Stage
Assume the multiproduct  industry transformation function is well behaved,  is intertem-
porally separable, and is homothetically separable in each time period in the input partition
I",  so that it may be represented  as F(ql, ... ,  q,  Xi,  ... , Xn) = 0.3 The variables q and
X represent outputs and aggregate  inputs, respectively.  The aggregate  inputs are defined
by linearly homogeneous  aggregator  functions  of the form  Xi = Xi(xl,  ... ,  xi), i = 1,
... ,  n,  where the xj's represent disaggregate  inputs. Under these conditions,  and perfect
competition,  profit maximization  can occur in two  stages and will be consistent with  a
single-stage  optimization  problem (Bliss, chapter 7,  property 3).
The first stage of the profit maximization  problem is to solve
(1)  II(p,  W) = max[pq' - WX': F(q, X) E T].
q,X
The p and q are  1 x  m vectors of output prices and quantities,  respectively; X and  W are
1  x  n vectors  of aggregate  input quantity  and  price  indices,  respectively.  Each  Wi is
defined by a linearly homogeneous  aggregator function of the form  Wi(wi,  ... , wJ) and
is dual to the Xi indices. Each  wi represents the factor price corresponding  to the disag-
gregate input xi,  and T is the technology  set.
The left-hand side of (1) is aggregate  profit function,  and applying Hotelling's  lemma
gives the output supplies and aggregate input demands:
(2)  , W  ... , m,
pi
(3)  i  =  1, ... ,  n, W-  =  X,(p,  i),
which are homogeneous  of zero degree in  (p,  W) by Euler's theorem.
Note that the conceptual problem of treating inputs as final goods in the utility-based
models  is immediately removed by modeling imports as derived demand  from a profit
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maximization problem. The first empirical problem with utility-based models is defining
the first-stage  aggregates.  Defining the first-stage aggregate inputs in the profit model  is
conceptually  more  intuitive  because  the  standard  input  aggregates  (i.e.,  energy,  labor,
capital,  and  materials)  appeal  to  Chambers'  criterion  of "common  sense"  (Chambers
1988,  p.  157) and are therefore  less debatable.
To  see why, consider  how the two-stage  profit  maximization  approach  removes  the
conceptual difficulties  associated with the first stage of the utility-based  soybean  model
discussed earlier. First, because  soybeans are an input and are no longer placed in a utility
function, the question of weak  separability between other oilseeds or grains is no longer
a concern,  unless other  oilseeds  or grains  are  used in  the production  of the output(s).
Second, there is no longer the implicit condition that all goods in the utility function must
be  considered  and that all of the goods,  other than soybeans,  form  a single consistent
aggregate called "all other goods." Finally, the implications of the homothetic separability
assumption  are more  acceptable  in production  theory (linear expansion  paths) than in
utility theory (linear Engel curves).
Second Stage
When  the transformation  function  is homothetically  separable  in the In partition,  then
Blackorby,  Primont,  and Russell  (BPR) show  the sufficient conditions for two-stage  op-
timization are satisfied and conditional demands are obtainable. The conditional demands
can be easily obtained from Hotelling's lemma.4 That is, differentiate the aggregate profit
function  (1)  with respect to the disaggregate  input price (wj) to yield
(4)  _ dIi = 1,...,n;  j= 1, ... , Ji. awil
As in all duality theory, there are two equivalent representations at the optimal point
of xi  because there are theoretically two equivalent ways to write the second stage of the
two-stage profit maximization problem. These two forms are the same as the two equiv-
alent forms of the second stage of the two-stage utility maximization approach.5 However,
the two solutions to the second-stage problem are empirically different.
One approach  is to minimize the cost of obtaining a predetermined level of aggregate
input,
[Ji
(5)  C,(w,, X)  =min  m  wIJ  XI  = X(xI,  ..  .,  xi)  ,  i= 1,...  n,
Xij  j=1
which  has the solution x^  = x,.(wi,  Xi).  The left-hand side of (5) is the cost function for
this problem;  w, is the vector of prices in the ith group, and x. is a conditional Hicksian
input demand  function,  because  it is  conditional  on the  aggregate  quantity index  (Xi)
determined in the first stage; x* is homogeneous  of zero degree in w, by Euler's theorem.
By duality theory, the alternative  formulation  is
(6)  Xi(w;,  C)  = max  X, = X(x,,  . .. , x,)  i:  Ci i  ,  =  1,...,  n,
Xij  j=l
which  leads  to  the  solution  xw  = xi(wi,  C,).  The  left-hand  side  of (6)  is  the  indirect
production  (index) function and is analogous to the indirect utility function; xi  = xi(wi,
Ci)  is  homogeneous  of degree zero  in  (we,  Ci)  by  Euler's theorem  and  is known as the
conditional Marshallian (constant cost) input demand function, since it is conditional on
the predetermined expenditure, Ci. Chambers (1982) shows that the solutions to equations
(5)  and (6) are completely analogous to the consumer concepts of Hicksian and Marshallian
demand,  respectively,  and  are  equivalent at the optimal  point. Davis  and Kruse  have
labeled equation (5) and its solution "the conditional Hicksian system," and equation (6)
and its solution "the conditional Marshallian  system."
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While these  systems are theoretically  equivalent at the optimal point, the conditional
Hicksian  system suffers  two empirical problems.  First, the conditional  Hicksian  system
suffers the general errors-in-variable problem alluded to in Davis and Kruse, and therefore
leads  to  biased  parameter  estimates.  Second,  the  conditional  Hicksian  system  is  also
"separability  inflexible"  (BPR,  chapter  8).  Separability  inflexible  means  that once  the
restrictions  for testing  weak  separability  are  imposed,  the aggregator  function  also  is
restricted.  Therefore,  weak separability may be rejected due to the restrictive form of the
aggregator function and not due to a violation of weak separability.  Separability inflexible
also implies  one cannot perform  separate  tests of the two sufficient conditions  for two-
stage budgeting (i.e., weak separability and linear homogeneity of the aggregator function).
Alternatively,  the conditional  Marshallian  system admits neither the errors-in-variable
problem  (Davis and  Kruse)  nor the "separability  inflexible"  problem  (Yuhn), and  can
therefore be used to test for the two sufficient conditions for two-stage budgeting.  So, on
empirical grounds,  the conditional  Marshallian input demand is preferred.
Relationship Between Conditional and Unconditional  Elasticities
To obtain unconditional  elasticity estimates requires  the combination of the first-stage
aggregate  elasticities  and  second-stage  conditional  elasticities.  Because the second-stage
problem for the two-stage profit and two-stage utility maximization problems  is identical,
then the estimated conditional  elasticities are  identical.  However,  in isolation  the con-
ditional elasticities can lead to biased inference,  because they do not encompass all of the
price  effects  captured by the unconditional  elasticities.  Hence,  the relationship  between
unconditional  and conditional elasticities is important. The unconditional  elasticities are:6
(7)  ln(q,)  , aln(wj)
( 8) ~  adOln(q,)
aln(p)  =
(10)  dln(xwk)  qijkm  =
Q ik
S
km  j  E Ii,  m  e  Ik,  i  k,
(11)  daln(wx,)  =  m  +  +  ),  m E  ,  ,
(9)ln(wk)  =  jkm  - +
where
=  Oln(X)  i  ln(x 1 )  =  dln(X;,)  WkmXkm
12ik  aln(Wk  5  nijm  ln(wkm)  C  i  aln(pY  =km  Ck
Oln(q,)
aln(x,)
Equation  (7)  shows  that the output elasticities  with respect  to the disaggregate  input
prices  are a product of the output elasticities  with respect  to the aggregate  input price
indices  and the disaggregate  cost share.  Equation (8) is the output price  elasticity and is
determined solely by the first-stage results. Equation (9) shows that all disaggregate inputs
in the Ith partition must be either normal or inferior factors and have the same elasticity
with respect to the output price (pn)  as the aggregate input (X). Equation (10) shows that
if two  disaggregat  i  t  e  not  in the same  partition,  then  the unconditional  input
cross-price elasticities are determined by the aggregate input cross-price elasticities weight- cross-price elasticities are determined by the aggregate input cross-price elasticities weight-
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ed by the cost  share.  Therefore,  all disaggregate  inputs between two partitions  must be
either substitutes  or complements,  depending  on whether the  aggregates  are  substitutes
or complements.  Equation (10)  also shows that each unconditional  cross-price  elasticity
in partition Ii is the same with respect to an element in partition Ik. Equation (11)  shows
that when  two  disaggregate  inputs  are  in the  same  partition,  the  unconditional  input
demand elasticities are comprised of two terms. The first term is the conditional elasticity
from the second stage. The second term accounts for the change in expenditure allocated
to the ith aggregate  input due to a change  in a disaggregate  input price.
The possible biasedness of solely using conditional elasticities is highlighted by equation
(11).  Equation (11)  shows the importance  of capturing the first- and second-stage effects
of a price change, because the unconditional elasticity may be contrary in sign (substitute
or complement) and in elasticity value (inelastic or elastic) to either the isolated aggregate
or conditional elasticities. Because total expenditure allocations do change as prices change,
this  obviously  brings  into question  not  only the bias  in the magnitude of conditional
elasticities, but more importantly, the possibility of the conditional elasticities having the
wrong sign.  This result could have dire consequences for policy analysis.  Therefore,  the
circumstances under which the conditional  elasticities will be approximately equal to the
unconditional elasticities are of importance.
From equation  (11),  there are two cases in which the conditional  elasticity is approx-
imately equal to the unconditional elasticity: (a) if the own-price aggregate input demand
elasticity is approximately unitary, and (b) if the cost share is small. If either of these two
conditions holds, the error resulting from misapplied conditional utility maximization  is
small.  This is due  solely to the fact that the  second-stage  results  from both approaches
are equivalent,  as discussed.  However,  at the aggregate level,  the aggregate input demand
elasticities are expected to be more inelastic because of fewer substitutes.  In this case, the
unconditional  own-price elasticity would be more inelastic than the conditional elasticity.
This theoretical  result implies  that policy  implications  based on  own-price  conditional
elasticities for any functional form (Alston et al.) can be very misleading, unless the second
condition holds.  Notice that the unconditional  elasticity can be obtained by adding the
share to the conditional  elasticity if the own-price  aggregate  input demand  elasticity  is
perfectly inelastic.
Maintaining  any of these conditions  as assumptions  is not advised,  and equations (7)
through  (11)  all highlight the need to estimate  the  first and  second stages of the model.
It should  be noted that if the imported commodity  is an  input, then the unconditional
elasticities given by (7) through (11) will be structural  in the conventional sense, because
the correct set of regressors  is being used in the first  stage.  The same cannot  be said of
misapplied  utility-based  models.
Perhaps  the most  important  theoretical  aspect  of the two-stage  profit maximization
model  is  that it  satisfies  Quine and  Ullian's  first virtue  of a hypothesis: conservatism.
Quine and  Ullian state that  a hypothesis  is preferable  to its predecessor  if it conserves
(validates) all previous hypotheses. The two-stage profit maximization model satisfies this
criterion, because it conserves the empirical advantages of the two-stage utility models-
efficient use of degrees of freedom and mitigation of multicollinearity.  More importantly,
it conserves (validates) all previously estimated conditional  demand systems which were
based on utility theory.  For example,  the conditional  Hicksian system  (5)  conserves all
Armington-based  models  (e.g.,  Armington;  Davis  and  Kruse;  Duffy,  Wohlgenant,  and
Richardson;  Grennes,  Johnson,  and  Thursby;  Haniotis;  Sarris).  The  conditional  Mar-
shallian  system  (6) conserves  all  conditional  AIDS-based  models  (e.g.,  Alston et al.; de
Gorter and Meilke;  Heien and Pick).
The  conserving criterion  is satisfied because the second-stage  problem  from  the two-
stage profit maximization approach  is isomorphic  (observationally equivalent)  with the
second-stage problem  from  the two-stage  utility  maximization  approach.  This isomor-
phism provides a solution to the puzzle that conditional demand systems based on utility
theory  are conceptually  flawed but empirically  successful.  Because of the isomorphism,
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it can be argued  that previous conditional  demand studies actually  have estimated the
second  stage  of a two-stage  profit maximization  procedure,  as opposed  to the believed
second stage  of a two-stage  utility  maximization  procedure.  The  only difference  in the
second stage  between the two-stage  profit  and utility  formulations  is in interpretation.
While this point has been made other places (e.g., Theil, p.  74), the prevalent use of two-
stage utility  theory to  motivate  conditional  demands  for inputs  indicates  that it  is not
widely known or is ignored  due to misperceptions  about the relative  empirical  ease of
using two-stage utility models. Therefore, we will present an illustration of the empirically
appealing two-stage  profit maximization  model.
An  Empirical Illustration
As an empirical illustration, we concentrate on estimating the unconditional input demand
elasticities given  in equations  (10)  and (11)  for hardwood  lumber in Japan.  We  chose
Japanese hardwood lumber demand as an econometric  illustration for two reasons. First,
Japan  uses lumber from  temperate  and tropical  sources  as inputs  in the furniture  and
construction industries and we wanted to demonstrate the correct econometric procedures
for  testing  the  intuitive  notion  that  temperate  and  tropical  hardwood  lumber  can  be
modeled  as  two  conditional  demand  systems.  Second,  the  data  set available  for  this
industry  is very  rich,  yet  we were  unable  to obtain  a quantity  measure  for one of the
inputs.  Because  industry-level  data may be difficult  to obtain in some cases, this can be
a  shortcoming of the  two-stage  profit  approach.  We  wished  to explore  the theoretical
implications  of limited data within the model.
The data series span  1970 through  1988.  Industry studies (e.g., Timber Research  and
Development  Association) suggest that it is reasonable  to consider four aggregate  inputs,
besides hardwood lumber: capital, energy,  labor, and softwood. A listing of the variables,
their definitions,  units of measure,  and  sources  is displayed  in table  1. All  price  series
were  in Yen and deflated  by the Wholesale Price  Index,  found in the Japan Statistical
Yearbook (Japan Management  and Coordination Agency). For a more detailed discussion
of the data and markets,  see Jensen,  Davis, and Bevins.
We followed the standard recursive estimation approach of estimating the second stage
first and then the  first stage (e.g., Barnett;  Fuss). 7Each stage is estimated using Zellner's
iterated  seemingly  unrelated  regression  (ITSUR)  method,  which  is  equivalent  to  full
information  maximum likelihood (see Fuss, pp. 99-102).  Throughout the estimation we
assumed an additive, contemporaneously  correlated error structure with finite variances
and covariances.  We imposed  symmetry,  adding up, and homogeneity,  and only tested
the sufficient conditions for two-stage budgeting: weak separability and linear homogeneity
in the aggregator  functions.
Second-Stage Estimation
In the second stage of the model, we estimated the conditional Marshallian  system because
it admits  no  errors-in-variables  or  separable  inflexibility  problem  as discussed.  Yuhn
proves the  Marshallian  system overcomes  the  separable inflexible  problem and suggests
the following translog indirect aggregator  specification:
(12)  ln(Xi) = a  +  yjln(w 1j)  +  yiln(Ci) +  'yucln(wij)ln(Ci) +  'ii[ln(Ci)] 2
+  - 7j  'kln(wj)ln(wik),
J  k
and by Roy's identity,
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Table  1.  Variable Names,  Definitions,  Units of Measure, and Sources
Vari-
able  Units of
Name  Definition  Measure  Sourcea
First Stage:
q,  Quantity of furniture and fixtures
p,  Price index  of furniture and fixtures
q 2 Total construction  area
P2  Price index  of construction
X,  Hours worked by regular workers,  furniture and fixtures
manufacturing
W,  Index of hourly wages, furniture and fixtures  manufactur-
ing
X2 Quantity of woodworking machinery
W 2 Price index  of woodworking machinery
W 3 Wholesale price index for petroleum and coal
X 4 Quantity index of construction  materials and machineryb
W 4 Price index of construction  materials and machinery
X5  Hours worked by regular workers,  construction
W5  Index of hourly wages, construction
X 6 Quantity index of other wood materialsc
W6  Price index  of other wood materials
X7  Quantity index of temperate nonconiferous lumber
W 7 Instrumental Divisia price index of temperate nonconifer-
ous lumber
X 8 Quantity index of tropical nonconiferous  lumber
W 8 Instrumental Divisia  price index of tropical nonconiferous
lumber
Second  Stage:
X 6j  Quantity of temperate nonconiferous lumber; j  = US,
Other Temperated
wj  Price of temperate nonconiferous  lumber; j = US,  Other
Temperate
X7j  Quantity of tropical nonconiferous lumber; j = Indonesia,
Malaysia,  Philippines,  Japan, Other Tropicale
W vj  Price of tropical nonconiferous lumber; j  = Indonesia,
Malaysia,  Philippines,  Japan,f Other Tropical
Pieces
1970 =  100
1,000 square meters
1970 =  100
1,000 hours
1970 =  100
Pieces
1970 = 100















a JSY = Japan Statistical  Yearbook (Japan Management  and Coordination  Agency), YFP =  Yearbook of Forest
Products  [United Nations (UN)], FPP = Forest Products Prices (UN), and CTS = Commodity Trade Statistics
(UN).
b This is a Divisia quantity index constructed from the prices and quantities of construction machinery including
land preparation  machinery, cranes/excavators,  and concrete  machinery,  and construction  materials including
iron and steel, hollow cement blocks, and wooden fiber cement board. The dual Divisia price index is constructed
using Fisher's weak factor reversal  test.
c The other wood,  temperate  nonconiferous,  and tropical  nonconiferous quantity  indices  are Divisia indices.
The  Divisia  price  index  for  other wood  is  the dual  Divisia  index  as  in construction.  Other  wood  includes
softwood lumber and plywood.
d Other temperate sources  included Canada,  China, the USSR,  EC countries,  and North and South Korea.
e Other tropical sources included Singapore,  Thailand, and Brazil. Japan is included as a tropical source because
many of the logs that are imported for sawn wood  are tropical.
f The price of lauan thick boards is used as a proxy for Japanese lumber price. This proxy is plausible because,
during the sample  period, over 70% of logs consumed were from major tropical exporters.
Y +  yceln(C)  +  S  y,1n(w,,)
1,i  +  yiiln(C)  +  'Yikcln(Wik)
k
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Table 2.  Summary of Test Statistics for the Second-Stage  Models
Sum of  Calculated  Degrees of  Reject/Fail to
Models  Squared Errors  x2  Freedom  Rejecta
Temperate and Tropical System:
Unconstrained Model  97.17
Linear Homogeneity  105.63  8.45  8  Fail to reject
Additive Weak Separability  115.00  9.37  8  Fail to reject
Temperate System:b
Unconstrained Model  32.01
Linear Homogeneity  35.00  3.00  3  Fail to reject
Tropical System:b
Unconstrained Model  74.06
Linear Homogeneity  80.09  6.03  6  Fail to reject
Notes:  To avoid the singularity problem  induced by shares summing to one, the Japanese  share equation was
dropped in the overall system and in the tropical system.  The other temperate  share equation  was dropped in
the temperate  system.
aThe  appropriate significance  level of the test, 6,,  depends on the significance  level  of the prior test, such that:
6i  =  1 - l(1  - 6).
j=
1
The significance  level  selected for 6, is  .05,  so 62  .10.
b Temperate sources  were defined to be  the United States  and other temperate  sources;  tropical sources  were
defined  to be Indonesia,  Malaysia,  the Philippines, Japan,  and all other tropical sources (see table  1).
sequentially  test for weak  separability  and  then  linear  homogeneity  of the  aggregator
function.  The parametric  restrictions  for weak  separability  and linear homogeneity  are,
respectively,
(14)  Yijm  =  ikmn  = 0,  j  k E Ii,  m  Ii,
(15)  i =  1,  Yii  =  Yij  =  V j.
The results of the tests are shown in table 2. We first assumed that aggregate  hardwood
lumber (tropical and temperate)  is weakly separable from all other inputs. We then tested
and failed  to reject linear  homogeneity  in aggregate  hardwood  lumber expenditures,  as
assumed  by the theory.  Next,  we tested and  failed to reject weak  separability  between
tropical and temperate  hardwood lumber in the aggregate  hardwood  lumber system,  so
there exist consistent tropical and temperate aggregates. We then tested and failed to reject
the hypothesis that the sub-aggregate temperate system and sub-aggregate  tropical system
were each linearly homogeneous  in expenditures,  as required  by theory.  Hence, the suf-
ficient conditions for modeling temperate and tropical hardwood lumber as two separate
conditional  Marshallian systems are satisfied.
The parameter  estimates for the temperate  and tropical systems are displayed in table
3, along with their asymptotic t-statistics. Many of the parameters are significantly different
from zero. From these estimates  we calculated  the conditional  (second-stage) price  elas-
ticities using the formula
( 16)  =  __  [nijm  +  Si7  'Yijm], (16)  r  h  jm-  [  +  l
where  iijm  = 1 ifj = m, and zero  otherwise. The conditional demand  elasticity matrix is
presented in table 4.  With the exception of the Philippines,  all own-price elasticities  are
negative.  Many  of the cross-price  elasticities  are negative,  suggesting that  lumber  from
these sources is considered a complement.  But as mentioned,  it is important to account
for the  first-stage  results because  conditional  elasticities  in isolation can be  misleading.
We should note, however, that because the cost shares are small for this market (table 4),
the second criterion for unconditional elasticities being approximately equal to conditional
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Table 3.  Parameter Estimates from the Temperate and Tropical Second-Stage  Systems
Estimated Parameters:  yi
Equation  Intercepts  US  OTM  I  P  M  OTR
US  -. 849  .556  -.556
(22.39)  (7.05)  (7.05)
I  .028  .024  .006  .011  .009
(6.26)  (8.39)  (2.64)  (6.69)  (8.53)
P  -. 017  -. 020  .003  .008
(3.35)  (4.08)  (1.26)  (7.85)
M  .003  -. 001  .005
(1.33)  (.52)  (7.97)







Notes: US = United States,  OTM = Other Temperate Sources, I = Indonesia,  P =  Philippines, M = Malaysia,
and OTR = Other Tropical  Sources. Values in parentheses  are the absolute values of the asymptotic t-statistics.
elasticities  is  satisfied,  so  the  first-stage  results  are  likely  to have  little  impact  on  the
unconditional  elasticities.
First-Stage  Estimation
Because utility-based models make defining the first-stage aggregates difficult, there exists
an incentive either to not attempt first-stage estimation or to let available data define the
first-stage  aggregates.  Neither alternative  is attractive,  because the first yields only con-
ditional elasticities  and the second results in aggregates  that do not appeal to "common
sense."  While the first-stage  aggregates in the two-stage profit model appeal to "common
sense,"  there is no assurance  that all  the required industry-level  data will be available.
An unavailable price series can be circumvented  theoretically either by employing a proxy
via a perfect competition assumption or by redefining  the unrestricted profit function to
be the restricted (variable) profit function. Unfortunately,  the unavailable quantity series
is not handled with such theoretical  ease, and implicitly restricts the modeled technology
to be joint.
Lopez characterized  two types of flexible functional forms for profit functions:  flexible
functional  forms characterized  by nonlinear transformations  of the dependent  variable
(NLFFF), and  flexible  functional  forms  characterized  by linear  transformations  of the
dependent variable  (LFFF). When a quantity  variable is unavailable,  Hotelling's  lemma
applied  to  an  NLFFF,  like  the  translog,  yields  a  system  of product  and  input  share
equations  which cannot be  defined,  so the choice  of functional  forms  is limited to the
LFFF.  But,  as  Lopez  shows,  the LFFF  implies  that  the  multiproduct  transformation
function is input-output separable; hence, either production is joint (Hall) or the individual
production functions are quasi-homothetic (Lau). Both jointness and quasi-homotheticity
are unappealing alternatives.  Jointness increases the dimension of the parameter set and
decreases degrees  of freedom,  while quasi-homotheticity  implies all production functions
for  all  outputs  are  identical  up  to a  multiplicative  constant.  Pragmatism  suggests  that
jointness be tested empirically before adopting a restrictive quasi-homotheticity  technol-
ogy assumption.
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Table 4.  Conditional Elasticities from the Temperate and Tropical Second-Stage  Systems
Conditional  Elasticity with Respect  to the Price of Lumber from:
US  OTM  I  P  M  OTR  J
US  -1.294  .034
OTM  .042  -1.042
I  -3.863  -.764  -1.366  -1.018  6.011
P  -.914  1.917  -.386  -1.121  -. 496
M  -1.404  -. 331  -.895  -.631  2.261
OTR  -. 932  -. 857  -. 562  -1.045  2.396
J  .052  -. 004  .019  .023  -1.091
Notes:  Abbreviations are as defined in table 3. The conditional elasticities  are calculated at the means.  Mean
cost shares are:  US =  .5491, OTM = .4519,  I = .0084, P =  .0070, M = .0082, OTR = .0092, and J =  .9672.
As seen in table  1, the only variable we were unable to obtain was energy consumption
by industry,  i.e.,  there is no X3.  We  therefore had  to choose  an LFFF and  selected  the
convenient revenue  form of the generalized Leontief (Livernois and Ryan).
m  m  m  n
(17)  r,=  -2  ,  sPP  +  2  ,i/p  ,  = 1, . . .,  m,
I/=  s=l  1=1  i=l
n  m  n  n
where,  by symmetry, aos = as,  1 =  /,  = /,  and b  =  b,  and linear homogeneity  is implicitly
imposed. In this model, r, = pq 1; 1, s = 1, 2; and ri = - WiXi (i, j  = 1, ... ,  8)  (see table
1 for  variable  descriptions).  Following  Fuss,  we formed  an instrumental  Divisia price
index  for temperate  and  tropical  lumber  from  the  second-stage  results,  estimated the
system, and tested for nonjointness.
The results of the nonjointness test and the first-stage  parameter estimates are given in
table 5.  Though casual observation  suggests that furniture and construction are nonjoint
products, we suspected that nonjointness would be rejected based on Chambers and Just's
conclusion that limited input data biases the test toward jointness (p. 994).  The results
from the nonjointness test confirmed our suspicions. Given the restrictive functional form,
it should not be  surprising that the results  of the first stage are mixed.  Though some of
the parameters  are significant and conform in sign to theory, others  do not.
To calculate the unconditional hardwood  lumber elasticities  from equations  (10) and
(11), we first calculated the four required aggregate price elasticities from table 5, evaluated
at the means:  temperate  own-price  (Q77  =  -. 916),  temperate-tropical  cross-price  (p78  =
-. 139), tropical-temperate cross-price (287 = -. 313), and tropical own-price (288 = -. 01).
In  table  6,  we present  the unconditional  hardwood  lumber  input demand  elasticities
obtained by using (10) and (11).  An obvious pattern in the elasticity matrix in table 6  is
that each  of the cross-price elasticity rows between  elements of the separable  group are
equal because  of (10).  Also,  because the mean shares of the tropical  sources are all  ap-
proximately equal, all cross-price elasticities of U.S. and other temperate  hardwood with
respect to Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia,  Japan, and other tropical sources also are
equal.  Comparison of the unconditional  elasticities  in table 6  with the conditional  elas-
ticities in table 4 reveals there is very little difference overall in the elasticities within the
temperate and tropical blocks,  due to the small cost shares (i.e.,  case b).
Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this article was to present an import modeling framework  that removes
the previously  overlooked  conceptual  and  empirical  disadvantages  of import  demand
systems based on two-stage utility maximization, but to retain their empirical advantages.
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Table 6.  Unconditional Elasticities  from the First- and Second-Stage  Systems
Elasticity  with Respect to the Price of Lumber from:
US  OTM  I  P  M  OTR  J
US  -1.248  .072  -. 001  -. 001  -.001  -.001  -.134
OTM  .088  -1.004  -. 001  -. 001  -. 001  -. 001  -. 134
I  -. 172  -. 141  -3.85  -.757  -1.358  -1.009  6.97
P  -. 172  -. 141  -. 906  1.924  -. 378  -1.111  .462
M  -. 172  -. 141  -1.396  -. 324  -. 887  -. 622  3.219
OTR  -. 172  -. 141  -. 924  -.850  -. 554  -1.036  3.354
J  -. 172  -. 141  .061  .003  .027  .032  -. 134
Note:  Abbreviations are as defined in table 3.
The conceptual disadvantage is that most imported commodities are inputs and not final
goods.  This conceptual  misspecification  leads to three empirical  disadvantages  that  all
imply biased parameter  estimates and hence biased inference.  We have  shown and dis-
cussed how a two-stage,  multiproduct,  profit maximization  model overcomes  these dis-
advantages and yet retains the empirical advantages of the two-stage utility models. We
also have identified the conditions under which the biased conditional demand elasticities
approximately  equal the unbiased unconditional  demand  elasticities.  These two points
are especially important,  because conditional  demand systems and elasticities frequently
are reported.
We  have  presented  an empirical  illustration  using  Japanese  demand  for lumber  to
demonstrate the econometric  procedures involved in testing the sufficient conditions for
two-stage maximization  and in estimating unconditional elasticities.  Because estimating
unconditional  elasticities  requires estimating  the model's  first stage,  we have discussed
the theoretical  implications of limited data on profit functions in the first stage.
The two-stage profit maximization approach is not an empirical panacea, but, as made
clear in this study, neither is the two-stage utility maximization approach. As with most
models,  both approaches  suffer  weaknesses in the bridge between  theory and  empirical
implementation.  Hopefully, the inferential consequences  of these weaknesses have been
demonstrated. Comparatively,  however, the bridge between theory and empirics is stron-
ger for the  two-stage profit procedure than for the two-stage utility procedure,  when the
imported agricultural commodity is an input. Thus, based on an awareness of the limited
applicability of the two-stage utility model, inferences  and policy implications  should be
made with considerable caution when the model is applied to commodities that are inputs.
[Received March 1994;  final revision received August 1994.]
Notes
The producer theory-based  alternative  presented  in this study generally  is applicable to  all input demand
systems; however,  the focus  of the article on import demand  systems is due to the almost exclusive nature  in
which the theory of two-stage utility maximization has been applied in the literature to model agricultural import
demand.
2 The work in this  section  is an integration and  synthesis of the work of Blackorby,  Primont,  and Russell
(BPR); Bliss; Chambers (1982,  1988); Fuss; Lau; and Yuhn. The work presented here parallels the work of Theil,
and more closely, Pinard. However, the work presented differs theoretically and empirically, in order to facilitate
a comparison with the agricultural import demand literature  cited. None of the works cited comprehensively
present all of the points made in this article.
3 All standard properties of the transformation function, profit function, cost function, and indirect production
function are  assumed to hold (see Chambers  1982,  1988).
4 The proof is presented  in the appendix.
5  Compare the second-stage (conditional) problem discussed in this section with that of  Deaton and Muellbauer
(chapter 5).
6 The derivations  are found  in the appendix.
Davis and  JensenJournal  ofAgricultural  and Resource Economics
7  An ongoing debate in the literature concerning this approach is the exogeneity of expenditures in the second
stage  (e.g.,  LaFrance).  We failed  to  reject exogeneity  of expenditures  in  all  systems  with  the  Hausman test.
Exogeneity  of expenditures  is a moot point, if the consistent conditions  for two-stage budgeting  are imposed
and a double log specification  is used, because expenditures  drop out of the share equations.
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Appendix
Hotelling's  Lemma in Disaggregate  Inputs
Proof: From the aggregate profit function (1) and the chain rule,  we have
an  an  a a
(A 1)  w  w  w
uWi -- =W
idwij
To prove (A  ) equals xi,  note that because of linear homogeneity of the aggregator  functions,
Ji
(A2)  Wi(wil  ..  wii)X,(xil,  ..  x)  =  wmim.
r=l
Therefore, differentiating  (A2) with respect  to x,  yields
axi
(A3)  Wj,  m  =  1  =  ... ,J,. 'Ox,,
Differentiating (A2) with respect to  w,,  and some algebra, yields
a Wi  Ji  xi  xi
(A4)  iWnXt  +O  A  xi  wxi
Substituting (A3) into (A4) yields
aw,
(A5)  d  X = xi Ow, °
Substituting (A5)  into (Al) yields  equation (4) in the text.
Unconditional  Elasticity  Derivations
From the first stage of the model, we have
(A6)  q, = q1(P,  W)  : lI
(A7)  Xi  = X,(p,  W)  : it
and
th output supply,
th aggregate  input demand,
(A8)  C, =  Wi(wi,,  ... , w,,)X,(p,  W)  : ith expenditure.
From the second stage and by linear homogeneity  of the aggregator  functions, we  have
(A9)  x? = Cf(w,)  :  jth constant cost input demand,
(A10)  X, =  Cih(w,)  : ith indirect production,
and
(All)  C, = Xg(w,)  : ith indirect cost.
From (A11), cost minimization  and linear homogeneity imply
(A12)  ln(Wj)  = ln(C,) - In(X),
so, by Shephard's  lemma, and Xi being predetermined,
dln(W,)
(A13))  = Sij.
,Oln(wj)
~ %'
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Substituting (A8) into (A9), placing in log form, and differentiating  now yields
dln(xij)  Oln(W)  dln(Xi)  dln(Wk)  Oln[f(wi)] (A14)  +  I
Oln(wkm)  dln(Wkm)  dln(Wk)  dln(wkm)  dln(wkm)
=  ikSkm,  j  E Ii,  m E I
k,  i $ k,
which  is equation  (10)  in the text. Note the first  and last terms are zero because i # k.  When i = k,  equation
(11) in the text is
Oln(xi,)  dln(W)  dln(X,)  dln(Wk)  Oln[f(w,)] (A 15)
Oln(wkm)  Oln(wkm)  dln(Wk)  Oln(wk,,)  dln(wkm)
s  im(l  +  ai)  +  tijkm,  j, m E I,  i =k.
Equations (7)-(9) within the text are derived  similarly.